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Special Comment
THE CRAZY QUILT OF COMMERCIAL LAW: A STUDY
IN LEGISLATIVE PATCHWORK
By TENCE R. Fr-cemu*

INTRODUCnON TO A CRAZY QUILT

A crazy quilt is "a patchwork quilt made of irregular patches
combined with little or no regard to pattern."' The Kentucky
version of the Uniform Commercial Code' is rapidly becoming a
crazy quilt of commercial confusion.3 The latest variegation in
its diffusive development was mis-stitched by the 1964 Kentucky
General Assembly as an amendment to the licensing provisions

of our statutes.4
The ostensible purpose of this muddled mending was to repair
the damage to the security provisions of the Code 5 which resulted
from judicial jumbling in Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan8

However, its effect was to perpetuate the problem or even to
7
increase it.
It has been suggested that the uncertainties of Kentucky law
with respect to the title of motor vehicles can be expurgated only

by enactment of a certificate-of-title law.8 The 1964 amendment9
LL.B., University of Kentucky; member, Kentucky Bar.
College Dictionary (1953).
Ky. Rev. Stat. ch. 355 [hereinafter cited as KRS].
3See generally Whiteside, Amending The Uniform Commercial Code, 51
Ky.
3 F1962); Whiteside & Lewis, Kentucky's Commercial Code-Some Initial
Problems In Security, 50 Ky. L.J. 61 (1961).
4 H.B. 312, Ky. Acts 1964, ch. 59, § 2, was enacted as an amendment to
KRS ch. 186. Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 82, § 4, amended, Ky. Acts 1960, ch. 10, § 2,
and ch. 37, § 2, amended, Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 83, § 15, codified as and hereinafter referred to as IS 186.195, was repealed by Ky. Acts 1964, ch. 59, § 5.
5KRS ch. 355, art. 9.
6344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961).
7 The 1962 General Assembly had already proliferated the patchwork by an
abortive attempt to ameliorate the situation created by the Queenan case. Ky.
Acts 1962, ch. 83, amending portions of KRS chs. 186, 355 and 382; see Whiteside, s-upra note 3.
s Kripke, Kentucky Modernizes The Law of Chattel Security, 48 Ky. L.J. 369,
393 (1960); see also Whiteside, supra note 3, at 12.
0 As used herein, the 1964 amendment refers to H.B. 312, Ky. Acts 1964, ch.
59, § 2.
2 American
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is perhaps the best evidence which could be adduced to support
that position.'
Tim NATuRE OF THE LATEST PATCH

Subsection one of the 1964 amendment provides that financing
statements relating to vehicles required to be registered shall be
filed in the county of the debtor's residence or, if the debtor is a
nonresident, in the county in which the vehicle is principally
operated. This language conforms to existing law pertaining to
the proper place to register a vehicle in Kentucky." However, it
perpetuates the problems arising out of our Code provision that
security interests in automobiles owned by a debtor are governed

by Kentucky law only if the debtor has his chief place of business
in Kentucky or if the state of the debtor's chief place of business
does not provide for the recordation of security interests. 2 The
1964 amendment seemingly requires the filing of a financing
statement whenever a vehicle is required to be registeredin Kentucky without regard to the chief place of business of the debtor.
In the absence of authoritative interpretations, the practitioner's
natural caution dictates duplicate filing.
A closely related problem arises from our Code provision that,
in the case of a non-resident debtor, financing statements covering consumer goods and farm equipment shall be ified in the
county where the goods are kept," while statements covering
business vehicles shall be filed in the county of the debtor's principal place of business in Kentucky.'4 In either instance, subsection one of the 1964 amendment requires filing in the county
in which the vehicle is principally operated. It is clear that a
vehicle may be principally operated in one county yet garaged
or kept in another, and it is even more clear that it may be
principally operated in a county other than the one in which the
debtor has his principal Kentucky office. Such divergence demands duplicity of filing.
3o Unfortunately, the county clerks have a vest-d interest in opposing this
position with political pressure. Whiteside, supra note 3, at 12; Whiteside &
Lewis, supra note 3, at 75-76.
"1 See KRS 186.020(1).

KRS 355.9-103(2).
13 KRS 355.9-401 (a). The italicized words, in the case of motor vehicles,
are probably equivalent to the words "principally garaged" as used in insurance
12

policies.
14 KRS 355.9-401(c).
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Subsection one of the 1964 amendment also perpetuates the
extant ambiguity surrounding the requirement that, in the case
of a resident debtor, the financing statement shall be filed in the
county of the debtor's residence. Suppose a wholly domestic
corporation is engaged in dissimilar operations, each carried on
in a different county with separate staffs and vehicles. Which is
the county of the debtor's residence? Is it the county in which its
registered office is located, the county in which it transacts the
most business, or the county in which the particular division
which is using the vehicle is officed? The 1964 amendment fails
to unveil the answer.
Subsection two of the 1964 amendment requires the secured
party to obtain the owner's copy of the registration or transfer
receipt and to present it to the clerk with the financing statement
within ten days of its execution, whereupon the clerk is to note
the lien on the owner's copy and either note it on the clerk's copy
or forward information to the clerk of the county of registration
for notation. In Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan,'5 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the predecessor of the 1964
amendment 6 was merely a directive to the clerk, and the failure
of the secured party to comply with its provisions did not affect
the perfection of the security interest although the clerk was
forbidden to record it. The 1964 amendment is apparently
intended to obviate the untoward effects of the Lincoln Bank
case.

Unfortunately, its success in this regard is doubtful. In the
first place, subsection three of the 1964 amendment provides that
a secured party must pay a penalty of two dollars for late presentation of the required receipt. 17 Nothing is said about loss of the
security interest. In the second place, a section of our Code not
considered in the Lincoln Bank case makes the mere presentation
of a financing statement to the clerk and a tender of the filing
fee a sufficient filing for perfection of security interests.18 Therefore, it is not safe to assume that the 1964 amendment has -succeeded in overruling the Lincoln Bank case or in assuring subsequent creditors that they can rely on the registration receipt.
'G Supra note 6.
16 KRS 186.195, supra note 4
17 Of course, there are criminal penalties under KRS 186.990(1).
18 KRS 355.9-403(1).
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Subsection four of the 1964 amendment provides that the
assignor of a perfected security interest shall give a statement of
the assignment to the assignee and to the debtor. The assignee
shall then present the statement to the clerk of the county in
which the financing statement is on file. As in subsections two
and three, there is no provision that the assignment is invalid if
the section is not complied with. 19 Additionally, nothing is said
about the assignment of unperfected security interests, although
many dealers assign their interests to a credit company prior to
recordation. The result may be that debtors will not always know
the identity of the assignee or the fact of assignment immediately,
and this could cause some confusion.
Subsection five of the 1964 amendment pertains to termination statements. While it provides that the secured party shall
deliver the statement to the clerk of the county where the
financing statement is filed in the manner requiredby our Code,20
the two statutes are not totally harmonious. For example, the
existing Code provision requires the secured party to furnish the
debtor with a copy of the termination statement upon demand
or incur liability to the debtor,2' while the 1964 amendment is
silent on this point and contains only a $2.00 penalty to the clerk
for late filing.22 If the amendment is construed to take precedence
over the Code, the secured party could inconvenience the debtor
by failing to file the termination statement promptly.
Subsection six of the 1964 amendment requires a repossessing
creditor to file a termination statement or proof of its existence
within fifteen days of the sale of the repossessed vehicle provided
for in our Code. 3 This provision is fairly free of fault, except
that it neglects to impose stringent penalties or civil liability on
a neglectful secured party.24
Subsection seven of the 1964 amendment forbids a clerk to
register an out of state vehicle, concerning which the documents
presented to the clerk show a security interest, unless he obtains
a flinancing statement from the owner and notes it on the regis19 See note 17.
20 KRS 355.9-404.
21 KRJS 355.9-404(1).
22
See note 17.
2
3KRS 855.9-504 & 855.9-505.
2

4See note 17.
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tration receipt. This provision is directly in conflict with the
chief place of business rule of our Code discussed previously.

Nevertheless, this subsection appears to attain the objective
sought without success in the other subsections, that objective
being the assurance of the completeness of the lien information
on the registration receipt.
Subsection eight of the 1964 amendment states that "the fees
provided for in this section are in addition to any state fee provided for by law."26 This provision merely affirms the obvious.
Subsection nine of the 1964 amendment renders applicable
the residual criminal sanctions of the chapter.2 7 Again, it but
belabors the obvious.
Subsection ten of the 1964 amendment prohibits the clerk
from filing a financing statement if the registration or transfer
receipt has no space left for the notation of the lien. It requires
the owner to obtain and file a termination statement for each
discharged security interest and obtain a duplicate receipt from
the clerk with space for noting the new lien. Since subsection
five, as already indicated, places a duty to supply the termination
statement on the secured party but seemingly fails to provide the
debtor with an adequate civil remedy, it is difficult to comprehend how the owner can comply with subsection ten without the
cooperation of the former secured party.
Subsection eleven of the 1964 amendment provides that
security interests in vehicles owned by non-residents must be
perfected in and governed by the laws of the state of the owners
residence unless the vehicle is principally operated in Kentucky.
This provision merely repeats the errors already considered in
connection with subsection one.
RIPPING THE STrcHES

The predominant purpose of the filing provisions of our Code
is to provide a reasonably reliable method for giving and receiving
notice of security interests in personalty. Because motor vehicles
pose special problems in notice-giving, Kentucky has repeatedly
25 KRS 855.9-103(2).
26 A discussion of the

want of significance.
27 KRS 186.990(1).

fees found in the previous subsections was omitted for
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attempted to interweave its tailored title provisions into the
fabric of the Code. The result has been pattern pandemonium.
The Code was designed to blanket the entire field of commercial transactions. It is full of subtle interrelationships. To
attempt piecemeal to patch its provisions to correct particular
problems is to hazard a general weakening of its whole fiber.
Furthermore, any attempt to amend it by indirection is nothing
more than a futile effort to fabricate perfection out of whole cloth.
The mobility of motor vehicles no doubt warrants giving
special consideration to their regulation. However, legislation
intended to effect improvement in this area must either remove
their regulation from the Code altogether or directly amend the
Code with great precision to be successful. The most effective
solution would be the enactment of a certificate-of-title law.
Such a law would provide maximum commercial certainty through
compulsory central filing, and it could be easily harmonized with
the Code.
As long as the county clerks are threading the legislative loom,
a certificate-of-title law seems remote. However, direct legislation clarifying the 1964 amendment and either incorporating it
into the Code or excluding motor vehicles from Code regulation
altogether seems feasible and desirable. Until such legislation is
enacted, the crazy quilt of commercial confusion will continue
to cover the practitioner and his clients.
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